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                                                        19		 John	Hare	offers	evidence	from	biology	in	support	of	this	claim,	in	‘Hermaphrodites,	Eunuchs,	and	Intersex	People:	The	Witness	of	Medical	Science	in	Biblical	Times	and	Today’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	pp.	79-96	(p.93).	20		 Sex	Difference,	pp.	70,	81-83,	102-106.		De	Franza	is	also	a	contributor	to	Cornwall’s	volume	under	review,	where	she	notes	that	the	biblical	character	of	the	‘barren	woman’	might	also	include	those	now	named	as	intersexed:	DeFranza,	‘Virtuous	Eunuchs:	Troubling	Conservative	and	Queer	Readings	of	Intersex	and	the	Bible’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	pp.	55-77	(p.58).	DeFranza’s	essay	here	is	preceded	by	another	that	discusses	the	eunuch	in	biblical	literature:	Joseph	A.	Marchal,	‘Who	Are	You	Calling	a	Eunuch?	Staging	Conversations	and	Connections	between	Feminist	and	Queer	Biblical	Studies	and	Intersex	Advocacy’,	pp.29-54.	21		 Susannah	Cornwall	in	her	own	contribution	(‘Laws	“Needefull	in	Later	to	Be	Abrogated”:	Intersex	and	the	Sources	of	Christian	Theology’,	147-171)	to	her	edited	volume	(Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible)	is	quite	hesitant	about	identifying	biblical	eunuchs	with	the	intersexed,	carefully	arguing	that	absence	from	the	biblical	text	does	not	mean	absence	from	the	biblical	world	(pp.149-152),	while	noting	how	at	least	one	intersexed	Christian	recognised	himself	in	Jesus’	reference	to	those	who	are	eunuchs	from	birth	(p.148).	Cornwall’s	main	concern	is	to	argue	for	the	importance	of	‘experience’	as	a	fourth	source	(after	scripture,	tradition	and	reason)	for	Christian	theology,	and	draws	on	interviews	
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these	names	both	reveal	and	obscure.	They	reveal	that	there	were—that	there	have	always	been—third	sex	people,	but	the	nature	of	their	thirdness	or	intersexuality	is	hidden.22	We	cannot	read	back	onto	their	bodies	any	of	the	several	conditions	now	named	as	intersex,	whether	hypospadia,	various	forms	of	congenital	adrenal	hyperplasia,	varying	effects	of	androgen	insensitivity	syndrome,	chromosomal	variations,	and	what	today	is	considered	true	hermaphroditism	(or	hermaphrodism)	—the	presence	in	one	person	of	both	testicular	and	ovarian	tissues,	a	‘trait	that’s	rare	in	our	species	but	common	in	others.’23	Given	the	differences,	it	is	perhaps	misleading	to	think	of	the	intersexed	as	a	third	sex	between	two	others.	At	best,	the	idea	of	a	‘third	sex’	is	a	place	holder	for	the	complexity	of	human	embodiment.	‘To	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	we	are	all	intersex.’24	But	the	invocation	of	a	third	sex	was	often	a	way	of	referring	to	those	who	would	become	known	as	homosexuals,	those	who	were	thought	of	as	combining	both	sexes:	men	within	women’s	bodies,	women	within	men’s.	This	is	neatly	caught	in	Michel	Foucault’s	description	of	nineteenth-century	homosexuality	as	an	‘interior	androgyny,	a	hermaphrodism	of	the	soul.’25	We	may	trace	a	separating	of	these	two	kinds	of	third,	of	homosexuality	and	intersexuality,	but	if	doing	so	we	should	note	that,	early	if	not	later	on,	the	fear	of	one	was	the	detestation	of	the	other:	that	a	person	might	get	away	with	
                                                                                                                                                 with	a	number	of	intersexed	Christians.	Her	argument	is	typically	detailed	and	nuanced.	22		 Augustine	supposes	that	there	have	always	been	hermaphrodites,	androgyni.	See	
The	City	of	God	against	the	Pagans,	edited	and	translated	by	R.	W.	Dyson	(London:	Penguin,	1984),	Bk	XVI,	ch.8	(p.709).	23		 Roughgarden,	p.293.	See	further	DeFranza,	Sex	Difference	in	Christian	Theology,	pp.25-44.	24		 John	Hare,	‘Hermaphrodites,	Eunuchs,	and	Intersex	People,	p.	93.	The	invocation	of	a	‘third	sex’	is	not	meant	to	preclude	different	ways	of	counting;	of	thinking,	for	example,	of	five	sexes,	as	suggested	by	Anne	Fausto-Sterling	in	‘The	Five	Sexes:	Why	Male	and	Female	Are	Not	Enough’,	The	Sciences	(March/April	1993),	20-24.	The	‘code	of	“thirdness”’,	as	Gilbert	Herdt	puts	it,	is	heuristic,	‘emblematic	of	other	possible	combinations	that	transcend	dimorphism.’	See	Herdt,	‘Preface’,	pp.19-20.	25		 Michel	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality	vol.1	An	Introduction,	translated	by	Robert	Hurley	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin	Books,	1984	[1976]),	p.43.	[Michel	Foucault,	Histoire	de	la	sexualité	I:	La	volunté	de	savoir	(Paris:	Gallimard,	1976),	p.59.]	
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homosexuality	under	cover	of	intersexuality—though	these	were	not	the	terms	or	concepts	employed.26	Foucault	details	how	in	17th	century	France	people	ceased	to	be	executed	simply	for	being	hermaphrodites	and	instead	were	offered	the	choice	of	becoming	one	or	other	sex,	of	living	as	either	a	man	or	a	woman.	Problems	arose,	however,	if,	having	chosen	one	sex	they	then	used	their	other	sex	to	enter	into	what	we	would	call	a	homosexual	relationship.	This	happened	with	one	hermaphrodite,	who	having	become	a	man	then	used	his	other	sex	with	another	man,	and	having	been	discovered	in	this	was	burned	alive.27	A	happier	case	from	1601	is	of	a	Maria	who,	having	become	Martin,	lived	with	a	woman,	but	on	being	found	to	have	no	manhood	about	him	was	sentenced	to	burning,	but	on	appeal,	while	still	judged	to	be	a	woman	was	ordered	to	live	as	such	chastely.28	Foucault	finds	this	significant	as	the	first	case	to	involve	a	proper	clinical	diagnosis,29	and	for	the	explicit	naming	of	the	hermaphrodite	as	monster.30	A	similar	story	comes	from	1765,	in	which	Anne	Grandjean,	who	on	finding	herself	attracted	to	girls	decided	to	live	as	a	boy,	moved	to	Lyon	and	married	Francoise	Lambert.	Being	exposed,	she	was	convicted	of	having	lived	with	a	woman	and	sentenced	to	the	pillory.	But	on	appeal	her	case	was	dismissed,	but	with	the	requirement	to	live	as	a	woman	without	entering	into	any	further	intimacies	with	women.	Foucault’s	interest	in	this	second	case	is	that,	at	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	the	medical	testimony	rejects	the	idea	of	the	monstrous	hermaphrodite	as	a	mixture	of	two	sexes,	and	instead	
                                                        26		 One	can	discern	an	alike	fear—that	people	might	get	away	with	homosexuality	under	cover	of	thirdness—in	the	writing	of	someone	like	Oliver	O’Donovan,	but	with	the	cover	now	the	marriage	of	transsexuals.	See	Oliver	O’Donovan,	
Transsexualism	and	Christian	Marriage	(Bramcote:	Grove	Books,	1982).	This	early	piece	by	O’Donovan	offers	a	good	example	of	Protestant	dimorphic	fundamentalism.	27		 Michel	Foucault,	Abnormal:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France	1974-1975,	edited	by	Valerio	Marchetti	and	Antonella	Salomoni,	translated	by	Graham	Burchell	(London:	Verso,	2003	[1999]),	p.67.	28		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.68.	29		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.69,	The	clinical	account	was	given	by	Jacques	Duval.	See	further	Joseph	Harris,	‘La	Force	du	Tact:	Representing	the	Taboo	Body	in	Jacques	Duval’s	Traité	des	hermaphrodits	(1612)’,	French	Studies	57.3	(2003),	311-322.	30		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.71.	However,	Augustine	already	found	the	hermaphrodite	monstrous,	though	entirely	willed	by	God.	See	The	City	of	God,	Bk	XVI,	ch.8	(pp.707,	709).	Roland	Barthes	picks	up	on	the	monstrosity	of	the	hermaphrodite	from	Foucault.	See	The	Neutral,	p.191.	
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proposes	that	there	are	only	those	with	defective	genitalia	that	render	them	infertile.	Now	there	are	‘only	eccentricities,	kinds	of	imperfection,	errors	of	nature.’31	And	this—Foucault	argues—allows	for	a	new	kind	of	monstrosity	to	emerge	in	the	nineteenth	century,	which	is	a	‘monstrosity	of	character’.	It	is	a	shift	from	the	‘juridico-natural	to	the	juridico-moral;	a	monstrosity	of	conduct	rather	than	the	monstrosity	of	nature.’32	It	is	the	monstrosity	of	homosexuality,	to	be	named	as	such	later	in	the	nineteenth	century.33	Foucault	finds	that	in	different	times	different	figures	have	been	found	monstrous.	First,	the	person	who	is	both	human	and	animal,	second	the	conjoined	twin,	who	is	both	one	and	two,	and	finally,	in	the	eighteenth	century,	the	hermaphrodite,	who	is	both	male	and	female.	In	all	these	cases	the	monstrosity	is	that	of	the	third,	the	one	who	crosses	the	divide	between	two	separate	domains,	something	that	is	contrary	to	nature,	and,	more	decisively,	contrary	to	conventional	and	legal	categories:	people	the	law	cannot	accommodate.34	These	cases,	or	at	least	Foucault’s	reading	of	them,	suggests	both	the	conjunction	of	hermaphrodite	and	homosexual	as	monstrous	thirds,	and	that	even	as	the	site	of	monstrosity	shifts	from	one	to	the	other,	from	the	hermaphrodism	of	the	body	to	that	of	the	soul,	there	remains	the	need	to	eliminate	such	thirds,	to	secure	the	realm	of	the	two,	the	simple	dualism	of	sex.	And	it	is	this	that	we	see	replayed	in	the	body	theology	of	John	Paul	II,	which	in	this	respect	is	very	much	a	theology	of	the	nineteenth	century.	A	third	‘third’,	to	which	I	am	paying	even	less	attention,	is	the	transgendered	person,	who	chooses	to	change	his	or	her	gender	to	either	the	opposite	of	that	given,	or	to	settle	between—as	‘they’	rather	than	‘he’	or	‘she’.	Yet	it	is	this	further	contradiction	that	gives	rise	to	one	of	several	ironies.	For	it	is	the	case	that	many	of	those	who	abhor	the	idea	of	changing	gender	are	yet	willing	to	have	the	intersexed	changed,	often	without	their	consent,	undertaken	when	they	are	too	young	to	know,	let	alone	resist,	what	is	being	done	to	their	bodies.	In	the	eighteenth	century	the	discovered	









                                                        37		 Amoris	Laetitia,	¶56	(p.45).	
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basic	thesis	stands	up.	The	one-sex	model	was	operative	in	much	ancient	thought—we	see	something	like	it	in	the	opening	chapters	of	Genesis—and	aspects	of	it	persist,	but	from	the	seventeenth	century	onwards,	a	little	earlier	than	Laqueur’s	initial	eighteenth	century	dating,	a	two-sex	model	gains	currency,	and	even	if	there	are	forerunners	of	such	an	idea,	it	gains	a	new	authority	from	a	newly	emerging,	empirically	based,	medical	science	that	by	the	nineteenth	century	has	usurped	any	previous	authorities,	not	least	the	theological.	Thatcher’s	interest	is	to	consider	the	current	gender	trouble	in	the	churches	once	it	is	acknowledged	that	much	earlier	Christian	thought	was	informed	by	the	one-sex	model,	a	formation	that	is	lost	to	view	when	a	modern	two-sex	model	is	projected	back	onto	earlier	texts	and	arguments.	Thus,	when	woman	was	but	an	inversion	of	man,	albeit	a	cooler,	weaker	version,	there	needed	to	be	no	worry	that	she	was	part	of	the	flesh	redeemed	through	the	incarnation,	little	question	that	the	hotter,	stronger,	more	perfect	version	of	the	human	should	represent	Christ	at	the	altar.	But	once	a	two-sex	model	predominates	these	conclusions	become	doubtful.	Is	woman	really	included	in	Christ	if	she	is	now	so	very	different	from	man?39	Vatican	teaching—according	to	Thatcher—posits	‘two	human	natures:	male	nature	and	female	nature,	which	are	absolutely	different.’40	It	follows	that	‘[i]ntersex,	third	sex,	and	transgender	people	are	officially	made	to	vanish.’41	They	are	not	fully	human.	But	also	vanishing,	later	if	not	yet,	are	women.42	For	when	there	are	two	
                                                                                                                                                 38		 See	Helen	King,	The	One-Sex	Body	on	Trial:	The	Classical	and	Early	Modern	
Evidence	(London:	Routledge,	2013).	39		 Angelo	Cardinal	Scola,	The	Nuptial	Mystery,	translated	by	Michelle	K.	Borras	(Grand	Rapids,	Michigan:	Eerdmans,	2005),	p.285.	40		 Thatcher,	p.98.	41		 Thatcher,	p.93.	42		 Of	course	one	ancient	solution	to	this	problem	was	to	think	that	women	would	become	men	in	the	life	to	come,	or	that	women	and	men	would	become	neuter,	angelic.	However,	the	tradition	resisted	this	idea,	insisting	on	the	preservation	of	sexual	difference,	however	transformed,	however	unnecessary	for	reproduction.	Patricia	Beattie	Jung	extends	the	preservation	of	sex	in	the	resurrection	to	include	the	intersexed,	though	in	a	slightly	ambiguous	way:	‘in	risen	life	we	will	be	transformed	into	people	of	the	apposite	…	sex,	that	is,	into	people	who	are	capable	of	being	reconciled	and	drawn	into	union	with	one	another	in	Christ.’	See	her	‘Intersex	on	Earth	as	It	is	in	Heaven’	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	173-195	(p.186).	
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natures,	male	and	female,	‘the	male	Christ	has	no	female	nature.’43	Female	nature	is	not	assumed	by	the	Word.	Thatcher	thinks	that	this	endangering	of	both	Christology	and	soteriology	derives	from	the	unrecognised	mixing	of	both	one-sex	and	two-sex	theories	of	human	being.	He	traces	it	in	both	ecclesial	documents	and	in	the	thought	of	influential	theologians,	such	as	Karl	Barth	and	the	inevitable	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar,	whose	theology	Thatcher	judges	to	be	‘immoral’.44	We	might	wonder	if	Thatcher	has	not	overread	someone	like	John	Paul	II,	overread	the	distinction	between	male	and	female	as	two	natures.	But	indeed,	John	Paul	does	present	sexual	difference	as	an	ontological	difference,	and	in	doing	so	threatens	the	salvation	of	women.	A	similar	concern	is	expressed	by	Megan	DeFranza,	who	notes	that	John	Paul’s	enthusiasm	for	the	spousal	meaning—heterosexual	orientation—of	the	body	as	the	imago	Dei,	threatens	the	humanity	of	those	who	have	no	such	orientation.	She	is	thinking	of	the	intersexed,	those	‘without	a	clear	masculinity	or	femininity’	who	‘would	at	best	know	only	a	distorted	view	of	love	and	at	worst	be	placed	outside	the	possibility	of	love.’45	They	would	in	fact	be	placed	outside	the	human,	alongside	the	homosexuals.46	DeFranza	also	notes	the	problems	that	heterosexual	spousality	poses	for	non-vowed	celibates.47	Vowed	celibates—such	as	John	Paul	himself—are	deemed,	by	John	Paul,	to	be	within	the	spousal	matrix,	because	married	to	Christ,	though	this	might	put	male	vowed	celibates—such	as	John	Paul	himself—back	outside,	since	married	to	a	man,	even	if	only	phantasmally.			
                                                        43		 Thatcher,	p.98.	44		 Thatcher,	p.106.	Thatcher	has	been	reading	both	Corrine	Crammer	and	Tina	Beattie	on	Balthasar.	45		 DeFranza,	p.212.	46		 See	further,	Gerard	Loughlin,	‘Catholic	Homophobia’,	Theology	121.3	(2018),	188-196.	47		 DeFranza,	p.213.	
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Conclusion	The	Church,	of	course,	does	not	have	to	think	that	heterosexual	spousality	or	nuptiality	is	the	mark	of	the	imago	Dei.	This	is	a	recent,	modern	development.48	It	is	of	a	piece	with	the	modern	idea	of	sexual	difference	as	a	fundamental,	ontological	difference,	with	understanding	male	and	female	as	the	only	possibilities	for	being	human.	All	non-conforming	beings,	those	who	are	third	to	the	duality	of	the	two,	are	excised	from	the	realm	of	the	human,	unless	somehow	changed,	reconstructed,	made	to	fit.	And	again,	and	of	course,	the	Church	does	not	have	to	accept	this	understanding	of	sexual	difference.	It	is	not	there	in	Genesis.	In	Genesis,	Adam	and	Eve	are	one	flesh	(Genesis	2.23),	and	this,	of	course,	is	how	Adrian	Thatcher	proposes	to	redeem	gender,	to	find	it	but	secondary	to	the	kind—humankind—in	which	the	Word	became	incarnate;	the	Word	into	which	all	are	incorporated.	‘The	essence	of	humankind	is	Christ.’49	We	do	not	have	to	ontologise	masculinity	and	femininity,	male	and	female.	We	do	not	have	to	turn	them	into	idols.	We	can	think	beyond,	or	before,	sexual	difference.	We	can	remember	that	when	Adam	and	Eve	came	out	of	the	garden	they	discovered	a	world	already	full	of	people,	that	they	were	not	the	only	two	(Genesis	4).	They	discovered	the	third,	waiting	to	meet	them.	
                                                        48		 See	Fergus	Kerr,	Twentieth-Century	Catholic	Theologians:	From	Neoscholasticism	
to	Nuptial	Mysticism	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2007),	pp.175-179,	199-201;	and	for	a	discussion	of	Kerr’s	argument	and	of	how	nuptial	mysticism	renders	the	homosexual	less	than	fully	human	see	Gerard	Loughlin,	‘Nuptial	Mysteries’,	in	
Faithful	Reading:	New	Essays	in	Theology	in	Honour	of	Fergus	Kerr	OP,	edited	by	Simon	Oliver,	Karen	Kilby	and	Thomas	O’Loughlin	(London:	T&T	Clark,	2012),	pp.173-220.	49		 Thatcher,	p.178.	‘The	whole	Christ	in	his/her	divine	being	is	beyond	distinctions	of	sex,	and	the	humanity	of	Christ,	as	tradition	east	and	west	insists,	is	inclusive	of	all	humans	whatsoever,	for	He	is	confessed	by	the	church	as	homo	not	vir,	
anthròpos	not	anèr’	(p.179).	
